Interesting Links for 20-11-2022

[andrewducker]

1. Labour plans to abolish the House of Lords

(tags:labour houseoflords reform politics )

2. How to build your own living sphinx (I probably shouldn't do this with Jim)

(tags:cats sand video )

Comments

[cmcmck]

They still seem to want a second house though.

[andrewducker]

I have to say that I've never really seen the point of a second chamber.

[skington]

AIUI there are two reasons for having a second chamber.

The classic House of Lords reason is to have a revising chamber where unelected but seriously-minded people (ideally retired politicians with no skin in the game any more, or domain specialists) look at laws carefully and say to the House of Commons "did you actually mean this?". This is supposed to be the "nobody would have designed a system like this, but it turns out that it's really useful" genius of the UK constitution. Given that recent governments have packed the Lords to get a majority, and we still have hereditary peers and bishops, arguably the Lords no longer serves this purpose.

The other reason is to have a chamber which is not purely democratically elected, to act as a check on the democratically-elected lower house. This is a checks and balances and "we really have to agree a whole lot", although depending on the power of the upper house the impact can be limited. In France, the Senate is indirectly elected by local authority (council, département, region) officials, and tends to be more rural and right-wing (but I repeat myself) than the Assemblée Nationale. It doesn't have much power other than brief annoyance, though. In the US, the Senate is prestigious (fewer members so each member gets proportionally more media exposure; government and legal appointees have to be voted in by the Senate), and there's a saying that every Senator sees a future President of the US when they look in a mirror.

I suspect that Gordon Brown's plans are for a second chamber which is deliberately (a) elected somewhat proportionally locally, so to give smaller parties (e.g. Greens, Mebyon Kernow, but I suppose also Respect unfortunately) a say, but also (b) deliberately non-proportional at a state-wide level, so to favour non-England nations and non-SE England regions. This feels like a stable-door way of saying "OK, but the next time we think of doing something as stupid as Brexit, we need everyone to agree".

Either way, while I take your point that if we have some kind of PR, there's no need for two chambers, this isn't what's being proposed now.

[calimac]

A second house has proved to be a very good thing. It adds greatly to available parliamentary time to consider details of laws and contemplate broader issues that the Commons doesn't have time to deal with. And as long as it can only make suggestions to the Commons and doesn't have any power to enact anything of its own - and it doesn't - it doesn't matter that it's not elected. (Though goodness knows the appointment process could stand improvement.) If it's elected, pressure will grow to give it some of its power back.

In the US, and in almost all of its states, we have two elected legislative houses, which often clash but are very useful to have working in tandem.

[dewline]

It seems at times like our Senate in Canada has been a pain in the neck, whether they were rubber-stamping bills or putting the brakes on. Other times, not so much, for the same reasons.

[rhythmaning]

I think we need a second house to truly scrutinise legislation, particularly if governments have a large majority - it is too easy for the lower house to force through badly thought out legislation.

[andrewducker]

If the lower house is elected democratically then a large majority means a large majority of voters selected them, and they should be able to vote things through.

An upper house only seems useful if you've got a fundamentally undemocratic election system, as we currently do.

So if you're fixing something, fix *that*.

[calimac]

Speaking, again, from a country with several dozen legislatures of two democratically elected houses, this doesn't mean they work in lockstep or that they do what their voters want.

If you've been following our recent federal midterm election, that gave a fine illustration of that.

[andrewducker]

The USA is based on the same fundamentally undemocratic voting system.

I do not see what a second house would add to a proportionally elected house.

[calimac]

You actually think a proportionally elected house would eliminate the current usefulness of a second chamber? I startle at such naivite.

[andrewducker]

If you have an argument then make it.

If you're just going to insult people then feel free to leave.

[calimac]

I'm very sorry: I did not mean to be insulting. I couldn't initially think of anything to say except to lay down a marker of disagreement, and I accept that I phrased this badly.

[andrewducker]

That's fine, I appreciate the differences of opinion, and will work on a proper reply. Probably tomorrow though, as I'm bathing a child at the moment, and by the time I've then got her to bed my brain will be entirely made of goo.

[calimac]

I should be fair and elaborate on this.

1. There would still be massive pressure on parliamentary time. A second chamber relieves that.

2. A proportionally elected house would not be less contentious and argumentative, in fact more so, because in your present system the government can almost always get what it wants. That would be a lot dicier in a proportionate house.

[andrewducker]

I'm not sure how (1) isn't solved by just having more committees, and plausibly more representatives to staff them. Why you would need to split the committees into two whole houses and elect them separately makes no sense to me.

I'm not sure how argumentativeness is a factor here? What's the issue with people arguing?

[calimac]

Committees are very useful, but they're still taking up the time of the same people whose time is already packed with the functional chamber. More representatives wouldn't help: the Commons is already awkwardly overpopulated as it is. A second chamber is different people with a separate agenda.

I'm not sure how argumentativeness is a factor either, but I couldn't figure out why you said "I do not see what a second house would add to a proportionally elected house." What would make it less needed then than it is now?

[andrewducker]

Assuming PR for both chambers, what makes them a different group of people, and what makes their agenda different?

[calimac]

What makes them a different group of people? That they are different people. The one house's members are the people whose agenda is to be members of the House of Commons, which is the governing body of the country. The other house's members do not have that responsibility, and have the ability to undertake duties that the first house's members don't have time for, as described earlier. That's the main point of having a second chamber under the current UK system, however its membership is determined.

As for their political-issue agenda, we don't in any case want these to be too different, or debilitating conflict will occur even if one house holds the political power and the other does not. But differences will naturally arise in the course of things, if only because the members are human beings and not party automatons. That's true even under the present situations of party discipline and three-line whips.

And they will especially arise if the two houses are elected at different times, and consequently the PR allocations are likely to differ.

What MTBC and Rhythmaning wrote is also applicable here.

[rhythmaning]

I agree the current situation needs fixing!

But a second house, providing reflective scrutiny, would still improve legislation. Even if a lot of people vote for them, idiots writing laws would still be idiots!

[andrewducker]

Why does it need to be a separately elected group of representatives to do this, and assuming PR, what would lead them to come to different conclusions?

[rhythmaning]

I'm not certain that it does need to be a separate chamber. I accept the point (I think you made it!) earlier that a committee system, properly constituted, should be able to apply sufficient scrutiny.

But - and this is just a feeling! - having a second house on a different political cycle may remove poitical pressure from the legislative scrutiny. I'm not sure that a committee system would be seen as sufficiently independent.

[mtbc]

I like the idea of a second house with long terms and no reelection, as moderator/advisor on shorter-term populist fads or government turning delusional mid-term. Second chamber can have those properties while still be democratically elected somehow.

(The restoring trust sounds hiliarious, as if it's the Commons that's the paragon of integrity.)

[andrewducker]

I somewhat like the idea, while also worrying about having terrible people with outdated ideas that you can't remove for a very long time.

[mtbc]

I'll take that. (-: Perhaps we can somehow arrange it so that they'll at least have different terrible ideas from each other …

[rhythmaning]

That poor cat!!!

[simont]

I was faintly disappointed that #2 didn't end in some cunning technique to extract the cat without breaking the mould, and then fill the space with some appropriate substance to make a cast of it.

(Admittedly, extracting the cat without breaking anything would be a very tall order.)

[andrewducker]

If you're trying to do that then wet sand might not be an ideal material!

[channelpenguin]

Poor cat! Though it seems chilled out enough.

[bens_dad]

In 1999 we got rid of most of the hereditary peers, who may have been mostly conservative (not necessarily Conservative). No wonder the House of Lords is full of political appointees.

The selection of House of Lords may be unjustifiable, but I am much more concerned about the composition of the Commons.

(Yes, I am with Churchill in thinking that “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.”)

---

I definitely want two houses.
Getting something passed by a majority of two groups is a higher bar that just a majority of the total.
Having a fresh set of people looking at something that the first set think is finished is worth-while too.

[skington]

Regarding the cat, I need to share this classic IRC conversation.

[anna_wing]

That's a remarkably amenable cat. Who is also going to need a lot of brushing.

[hairyears]

The big one, for me, is that a second house elected in a completely differently way offers a way of mitigating 'Majoritarianism' - the dictatorship of a fifty-percent-plus one majority and the near-total exclusion of the interests of small minorities and regions with unusual needs.

It doesn't take long for the exclusion-from-decisions of a small and unpopular minority to become oppression.

A second chamber might, of course, replicate the majoritarian oppression: but differing internal mechanisms, that distinguish the two chambers, might mean that one of them is more collegiate and better able to give a voice to minority groups in coalition politics.

Also:
I would say that the 'revising chamber' function of the Lords could, in theory, be replicated in the Commons: but it hasn't been, yet, and the Lords have a lot to do.

Best not remove that before we've fully replaced that.

[fub]

In the Netherlands, we vote directly on candidates for the 'Second Chamber', which is equivalent to the House of Commons. We don't have districts or such for that. The Second Chamber is where laws are drafted, similar to the UK.
We also have the 'Provincial States', who decide on things regarding the provinces. (Small as we are, we have twelve provinces.) These representatives are also directly chosen, but because the issues are much more local, there are also parties participating that are independent of the national parties -- but the national parties also participate, of course. I think the terms for both Provincial States and the Second Chamber are four years, but they are offset by two years.
Some time after being sworn in, the members of the Provincial States elect the members of the 'First Chamber'. The First Chamber has to approve of all the laws the Second Chamber wants to make and tends to be filled with senior politicians. Sometimes, this results in very good compromises, because the government, while it does have a majority in the Second Chamber, does not necessarily have a majority in the First Chamber. The First Chamber is often more detached from day-to-day party poltics and more focused on things like internatinal law and the constitution. They don't often put up resistance, but when they do, it's often about fundamental issues and not some wishy-washy party politics.

Both chambers are democratically chosen (the Second Chamber directly, the First with one step in between), and the two-year offset allows the voters to put the breaks on either of these if needed.
I guess it works for us.

[danieldwilliam]

I am in favour of a second, (mostly) elected revising chamber. Certainly in the current circumstances. I have some more radical proposal at the end of this note.

I think a second revising chamber should do some or all of the following

1) take some load off the primary chamber. Not just in terms of raw time but also cognitive bandwidth and political capital - this last interacts with point 2 and point 3

2) the second chamber should have a different source of legitimacy to the primary chamber and this should link to its role in the constitution and the legislative process.

Examples include the Australian Senate which are elected at state level using PR, compared to the House of Representatives who are elected in relatively small constituencies using the Alternative Vote or the German Budesrat who are are delegates of the Lander

3) similar to 2) the revising chamber should have a different time horizon to the primary chamber.

Again, examples include the US Senate (6 year terms for Senators vs 2 year terms of Representatives, the Australian Senate 6 year terms vs 3 years of the Representatives. Some Italian senators are life appointments.

4) Part of the role of the second chamber is to slow down legislation and to ask "are you sure?" I think it is helpful that the second chamber have a somewhat different mandate from the primary chamber so that its delay and confirmation role has some legitimacy.

5) The second chamber in a UK context should be a source of expertise and experience (at least arguably). Not just subject matter expertise but expertise in how politics, government, legislating

6) less driven by a) party politics, b) personal aspiration c) role in the executive


So my suggestion for a UK second chamber would be

1) a large chamber (mostly) elected by Single Transferable Vote from the nations and regions (I think this holds true whilst the House of Commons is elected by FPTP, AV+ or STV in smaller constituencies). The Australian nexus sees the lower chamber at approx twice the size of the Senate. Working that backwards, a 600-seat House of Commons implies a 300 seat Senate. With 7 English regions, plus 3 region-nations, you get 30 senators from each region.

2) rolling 12 or 15 year terms (if the UK ends up with fixed parliamentary terms of 4 or 5 years then 3 of those terms) if we retain the current system of indeterminate terms then senators serving term of no less than 12 years and seats being vacated at the General Election after the senator has served 12 years. 10 senators from each region up for election each general election - roughly.

3) single terms only and / or a ban on serving in any elected office after being a senator

4) no senator able to serve in the government. Government sits in the lower house and must command a majority there.

5) I would entertain the the appointment of a small number of senators by local councils, by a special committee or ex officio e.g. former Prime Ministers are entitled to a seat in the senate

6) deliberately weak links to geographical constituencies

7) senators may be elected on a party ticket but they are explicitly personally elected - no chuntering on about senators who cross the floor having to stand for re-election or parties having a right to appoint replacements for casual vacancies.

8) revising and delaying powers only for legislation, scrutiny powers over government ministers, policy development ability, enquiry ability, elevated powers for the curation of human rights


One could take a more radical approach. Three suggestions below

1) Use sortition to create a system of Citizen Assemblies and Citizen Juries to scrutinise legislation and policy. However, that seems unlikely to happen.

2) Take something of the Lander Bundesrat and have senators appointed by local government

3) A system of my own devising is that we make the second chamber a place explicitly for special interests. Thusly,

(1) a very large chamber

(2) made up of members nominated by representative membership organisations. Any membership group in the UK could register to be a "representative group." So trades unions, the National Trust, the RSPB, the Manchester United Supporters Club. (There would need to be some sensible rules about what qualified and a way of excluding political parties) . I would also allow smaller membership groups to form coalitions if they wanted - so the Manchester United Supporters Club could group up with the Manchester City Supports Club to be, for the purposes of the second chamber the Mancunian Football Watchers representative group.

(3) you can be a member in good standing of more than one membership organisation (we might need some rules here about what counts as a member in good standing to include some form of membership activity and / or to limit the total number of membership organisations you can be member of for second chamber election purposes so that wealthy people can't become members of dozens of groups just by paying a membership fee)

(4) Using the d'Hondt system (or similar) seats are allocated to those membership organisations based on the number of members they have

(5) there must be some form of democratic process for the membership organisations appointment process. Not necessarily direct election by the members but control of the organisation in total or control of the organisation's second chamber appointment process must ultimately be democratic.

(6) membership organisations send representatives to the second chamber.

The people sent ought to end up with 1) some form of democratic legitimacy 2) subject matter expertise 3) orthogonal legitimacy and interest from the lower house

[danieldwilliam]

See also this on the role of a UK second chamber

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitution_unit/files/44_0.pdf