Interesting Links for 24-02-2024

[andrewducker]

1. The first round of U.S. secondary sanctions on Russia is working

(tags:USA Russia money war Ukraine )

2. "Our Company Is Doing So Well That You're All Fired"

(tags:business satire unemployment funny )

3. Water firms allowed to dump sewage into rivers using permits from the 1950s

(tags:UK water pollution regulation OhForFucksSake )

4. Monsterfucking is out. Monsterparenting is in.

(tags:monsters parenting funny stories )

5. Germany's Bundestag votes for cannabis legalization

(tags:Germany marijuana legalisation GoodNews )

6. What's going on with the collapsed culvert at Cameron Toll?

(tags:roads river Edinburgh )

7. Study finds that returning to the office doesn't improve company value, but does make employees miserable

(tags:business work office happiness )

Comments

1)

[calimac]

7th paragraph: "Why do non-U.S. actors bother complying with U.S. secondary sanctions? After all, if you're a Turkish banker in Istanbul, Biden has no jurisdiction over you. America can't put you in jail, or fine you."

14th paragraph: "Turkish financial institutions may be particularly sensitive to U.S. sanctions given the fact that an executive of Halkbank, a Turkish government-owned bank, was sentenced to 32-months in U.S. jail in 2018 for helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions and money laundering."

And no, the link doesn't explain this.

Re: 1)

[andrewducker]

Turns out they can totally put a Turkish banker in an American jail if they go to Miami.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Atilla?wprov=sfla1

Re: 1)

[calimac]

Sure, but the article ought to have said that's what he did.

Re: 1)

[andrewducker]

It would have been helpful, for clarity, I agree.

Re: 1)

[calimac]

"Clarity" hardly begins to cover it. "Avoiding the appearance of complete inconsistency" is more like it.

And if visiting the US is a regular activity of Turkish bankers (I wouldn't know, and don't care beyond making this point), then the assumption in paragraph 7 would be invalid in the first place.

Re: 1)

[hairyears]

Turkish financial institutions are sensitive to U.S. sanctions because they can be cut off from all correspondent relationships with US banks, and shut out of all US (and EU) markets.

That includes access to Treasuries and Gilts for their own reserves, overnight liquidity in the money markets, and the ability to service Turkish clients' foreign-currency accounts and exchange.

And no, they can't operate through intermediates: those banks and market players will be frozen-out for sanctions-busting too.

Nor can they service American clients operating in Turkey.

They could continue to operate, as several banks in Moscow do, as international paraiahs catering to criminals, set apart from the visible World economy, dealing though front companies and money launderers, and paying bribes to the local regulatory authorities all the way up to ministerial patronage. That's expensive and it carries all the risks associated with a criminal enterprise, including the risk of arrest if they set foot in the USA.

Re: 1)

[calimac]

Thank you; that's what the rest of the article said, and I read it. I just dropped in here to point out the apparent contradiction between the question they posed to kick that explanation off and the actual truth of the matter.

[simont]

The odd thing is, if those had been the 7th and the 8th paragraphs, it might have been much more obvious that the first statement was an untruth presented for rhetorical purposes, so that the second statement could explain why it's wrongheaded.

[andrewducker]

Not an untruth. You have to be a Turkish banker in *Miami* for them to have jurisdiction.

[calimac]

That para 7 is there for rhetorical purposes was already obvious. Para 8+ go on to answer the question, why should the Turkish bankers care?

What I was quoting it for was the apparent contradiction between para 7's "Biden has no jurisdiction over you" and para 14's US conviction of a Turkish banker.

The answer turned out to be that this banker had visited the US, but if visiting the US is a normal activity for a Turkish banker, than para 7 is wrong, the US -does- have partial jurisdiction over them.

[hairyears]

(1) I can see this in Britain and the EU's sanctioning of individuals and companies involved in trading Russian oil: they have London operations (or, at least, London counterparties in the markets and in the banking system).

Sanctions and money-laundering enforcement actions - when they are pursued - are a complete cutoff of all international banking and trading activity. In practical terms, this means frozen cash, frozen assets, and seizures for the principals; and fines, prison sentences, and asset seizures for the individuals who facilitate it.

The facilitating companies are eager to hang these individuals out to dry, even at director level: they are fined enough to force passing dividends or even insolvency, the regulators camp-out in their accounts department, and they comply under a credible threat that their banking licences and market memberships will be suspended.

We are already seeing energy and commodity trading houses shut down, and offshore registrations (the Netherlands, Dutch Antilles, and Dubai) are no barrier.

However...

I question the extent to which Turkish banks (and, by extension, Turkish players in the physical oil market) are actually stepping-back.

They are seen to be complying, but I do not doubt that some of them have two sets of books; and the smarter ones will have arms-length and deniable subsidiaries in the same 'Treasure Islands' that launder Russian oligarchs' money so thoroughly that clean and corruption-free London institutions and professionals can service Russian property investments in London with no fear of prosecution.

Overall, I think the primary and secondary sanctions are hitting Russia to considerable effect - Gazprom is no longer Putin's cash cow, and will probably need central bank support this year - but I suspect that their long-term effect will be enriching and entrenching thoroughly dishonest businesses in Turkey, India, Brazil, the UAE and China, to such an extent their economy and polity will be permanently compromised.

...And Russia will be weakened, perhaps to the extent of a collapse comparable to the end of the Soviet era; but their economy and polity will be even more corrupt than it is now, and their next dictatorship - or dictatorships, if the empire disintegrates - will be even worse than Putin.

I think it's worth it, even so, for the defeat of Russian aggression in Ukraine; but we had better hope that our own governments will work far harder to resist the corrupting effects of Putin's successors.

[bens_dad]

Hmm. As far as I can see, Ukraine cannot win as long as Putin in is power.
(Russia is so big that P can keep going at Ukraine. I see no chance of NATO taking on Russia directly.)

If Putin's successor will be worse, what can we do to maximize the chances that stopping the war is in their interest ?

[channelpenguin]

7. Ah, but the cruelty is the point!

7

[anna_wing]

Not all of us have jobs that can be done sitting at a desk.

Re: 7

[andrewducker]

I wouldn't expect research into RTO to apply to work types that couldn't be done at home.

Re: 7

[channelpenguin]

RTO - RETURN to Office. Logically, that would only apply to jobs where people we ABLE and HAD been allowed to work from home, but no longer are.

There are plenty of jobs that can't be done remotely, I think we do all understand that :-)