A simple solution to the 55% problem

[andrewducker]

Remove that rule.  This means that you can vote out a government, but that won't automatically trigger an election. The remaining MPs will then have to just work out a way of compromising if they want to pass anything, or sit with their feet up until the next election date passes.

Comments

[a-pawson.livejournal.com]

There seems to be a lot of confusion in the press about exactly what this 55% proposal means. But both the Lib-Dems and the Tories appear to be saying that a majority in a confidence vote would still bring down the government, but not trigger an election. It would require a 55% majority of the Commons to do that.

From BBC: former Lib Dem MP David Howarth, a legal academic who drew up the original Lib Dem plans for a fixed-term parliament, told the BBC the vote of confidence and dissolution of Parliament were "entirely different things" and said Mr Straw was "totally confused".

In other countries with fixed-term parliaments, if a government lost a vote of confidence the parties would have to try to work out a new government within the fixed term, he said.

He said critics had got "entirely the wrong end of the stick" adding: "This dissolution vote, the 55% for a dissolution, is not the same as, for a vote of confidence."

A Downing Street spokeswoman said the old rule would still apply to no confidence votes - but should a government be defeated, it would not automatically trigger an election as a 55% vote would be required to dissolve parliament.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

We already have that (AIUI) with the vote of no confidence. Doesn't trigger an election, just brings down the govt.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

There's far far too much confusion about this though, I'd like an official website that explains the correct version in very short words. I'd trust David Howarth to write it.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

Can you change your post (assuming that you become convinced that what I'm saying isn't mistaken)?

[andrewducker]

I know that what you're saying isn't mistaken in theory. In practice, I don't believe any government has carried on in a new coalition following a no-confidence vote.

[andrewducker]

Yup, that's my understanding of it.

[loveandgarbage.livejournal.com]

1920s Baldwin resigned after confidence vote - no election for formation of new govt.

Re: your post - remove which rule?

[lpetrazickis.livejournal.com]

I don't understand what's so bad about being able to have an election triggered at any time. If the government has lost the confidence of the house, you might as well have an election. Keeping it alive after the fact would only create a really pointless lame duck session.

Of course, I personally enjoy elections.

Harper brought in a fixed elections law here in Canada. He then broke his own law in 2008. Meh.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

In the UK we haven't had enough experience of coalitions to know what's typical or not.

It remains the case that the government collapsing will not itself trigger an election, and the Queen (with her strings pulled by the PM) will not be able to do it as before. So either 55% of the Commons can do it, or 50% + 1 of the Commons can pass legislation setting the date of a new election sooner than 2015.

David Howarth says he would have preferred a higher threshold than 55%, or indeed for there to be no threshold, and a bill going through both houses being the only way to move the election.

[andrewducker]

The one allowing for dissolution of parliament if 55% vote in favour.

[andrewducker]

It allows a government already in power to call a snap election because they are high in popularity but are worried about future popularity. It gives the incumbent an unfair advantage.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

The aim is that you don't get either party on the coalition running off and calling an election when they're doing well and their partners are doing badly - so say the Lib Dems get their electoral and political reform and then call an election when they think the Tories are likely to do badly and before the Tories have had a chance to put through their financial reforms. Or vice versa, naturally.

In general I don't want calling elections to be a PM's privilege as they tend then to call elections when they're popular - *not* when they're doing awfully and the country wants a change.

[andrewducker]

66% is needed in Scotland - or failing to elect a first minister for (I think) 28 days.

[pseudomonas.livejournal.com]

Yes, that sounds about right, though I'd think 14 days with no leader would be more than enough!

[andrewducker]

Negotiations in European countries can easily last for weeks while they hammer things out. If you've got seven parties all trying to form a variety of alliances then it takes time...

[loveandgarbage.livejournal.com]

So we would have no dissolution rule at all leaving power with the Prime Minister or dissolution will take place after the time period for the fixed term parliament?

In the latter you could have a deadlock case where no government can be formed - whcih is why the Scotland ACt has a time limit. No new government within the 28 day period (which may be too long) and there is a special election

[andrewducker]

Which is why I said:
"The remaining MPs will then have to just work out a way of compromising if they want to pass anything, or sit with their feet up until the next election date passes."

Giving them a time limit means that they can wait for the limit to pass and blame others. If they have 5 years to wait then they'll eventually have to start compromising, or admit that the country doesn't actually need any new laws...

It's not an entirely serious suggestion - but I sometimes think that the pressure of not having anyone "in charge" would be enough to get people to sort themselves out.

[communicator.livejournal.com]

I think some commenters are disingenuous in saying that neither Conservative or Lib Dem have sufficient votes to 'trigger an election' and/or 'dissolve the coalition'. Although this is technically true, one can also assume that when they have got themselves sorted out, however soon that is, the Labour party will have an interest in supporting any vote for dissolution. Because it gives them a chance to either form a rainbow coalition or contest an election.

Adding Labour votes, which is a fair assumption, means the cut-off is positioned exactly to allow Conservatives to dissolve the coalition, but not Lib Dems. I don't think it's paranoid to find that suspicious.

[andrewducker]

Dissolving the government/coalition takes 50%+1MP.

It takes 55% to call a new election.

The former will be possible, the latter impossible without the Conservatives wanting it.

However, if the opposition parties can gather over 50% of the vote then they can always change the law.

[lpetrazickis.livejournal.com]

Ideally, the press would crucify a government for doing that.

In fact, a lot of the high drama here in Canada has been about every party going out of its way to make sure it doesn't look like they are the ones triggering an election.

The British situation may be different.

[communicator.livejournal.com]

Yes, I dashed that off without clarity. My point is Con+Lab > 55%, LD+Lab < 55%. That means the two sides of the coalition have unequal power.

[andrewducker]

Over here it largely seems to be seen as part of "playing the game of politics".

[matgb]

Well, technically the Governor General used reserved powers to dissolve, as the constitution hadn't been amended so Harper's law was useless anyway.

I've always favoured fixed terms, and think that 55% is too low, but the argument for/against fixed terms is a good one to have. The stupid tribalist ignorance going around about the 55% rule is not a discussion worth having.